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POLANYI ON RELIGION 
Harold Kuester 
I. The Nature of Religion 
Polanyi's appreciation for religion derives in part from his critique of doubt as an 
epistemological method. He equates such doubt with positivism and considers 
both to be ultimately unintelligible. According to the positivistic ideal, doubt and 
knowledge are antithetical; Polanyi's position is that knowledge can never exclude 
the possibility of doubt. There are no plain, simple 'facts' knowable apart from be-
liefs; knowledge is based upon personal judgments (beliefs) accepted by the indi-
vidual as universally valid (true), not upon infallible heuristic processes. 1 
Within this context, Polanyi regards religious knowledge as the recognition of 
complex wholes: 
God cannot be observed, any more than truth or beauty can be observed. 
He exists in the sense that He is to be worshipped and obeyed, but not 
otherwise; not as a fact-any more than truth, beauty or justice exist as 
facts. All these, like God, are things which can be apprehended only in 
serving them. 2 
Religious knowledge is in this respect essentially similar to other human knowl-
edge and thus, at least in principle, subject to influence by other knowledge. 
Nevertheless, religious knowledge is farther removed from 'factuality' than are 
other complex wholes. 3 Polanyi's meaning here can be seen as an extension of his 
distinction between statements about persons and statements about inanimate 
sense objects. The former require for their recognition a greater degree of personal 
participation and in this sense are farther removed from 'factuality' than are the lat-
ter.4 Thus recognition of God requires an even greater degree of personal participa-
tion than do statements about persons. 
Polanyi seems to contradict the above view when he states that religious wor-
ship, Christian theology and the Bible can say "nothing that is true or false."5 But 
this cannot be since a major conclusion of his epistemology is that complex wholes 
have greater reality than more tangible entities. 6 Consequently, the greater intangi-
bility of complex wholes does not mean that they are neither true nor false. Religi-
ous complex wholes cannot be an exception to the rule without involving Polanyi 
in self-contradiction. If, on the contrary, he means merely that any determination 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
VoU No.1 January 1984 
All rights reserved. 
77 
78 Ilarold J(uester 
of the truth or falsity of religious knowledge necessitates passing beyond the 
bounds of other fonns of knowledge in the same sense that knowledge of persons 
requires greater personal participation and therefore passes beyond the bounds of 
knowledge of inanimate sense objects, then there exists no question of contradic-
tion. We interpret him to intend this latter meaning. 
Our interpretation is supported by Polanyi' s likening of the relation between 
religion and sense experience to the relation between a "heuristic vision" and "fac-
tual experience." Knowledge of "factual experience" is not possible apart from 
knowledge of a "heuristic vision": the two types of knowledge represent the oppo-
site ends of a continuum and are therefore never entirely separable. Religion can be 
viewed as comprising those "heuristic visions" farthest removed from factual ex-
perience. Hence the relation of religion to factual experience is essentially similar 
to the relation of any other heuristic vision to factual experience. 7 
As intimated in our discussion of the relation between "heuristic vision" and 
"factual experience," Polanyi regards all fonns of human knowledge as existing on 
a single continuum. On this point, he disagrees with Paul Tillich, who contrasts 
science (method of absolute detachment) with philosophy and religion (method of 
participation). However, Polanyi agrees with Tillich that there are different di-
mensions of reality which, by their nature, cannot contradict one another. 8 For 
Polanyi, these different dimensions refer to hierarchically ordered types of know 1-
edge, which are related in the following manner. A lower, less general level of 
knowledge is necessary but not sufficient to account for the existence of a higher 
level of knowledge. Since the higher level is never specifiable in tenns of the 
lower, the lower level cannot be sufficient grounds for detennining the truth or fal-
sity of the higher level, except when the higher level violates the structure of a 
lower level. For example, a perpetual motion machine would violate the laws of 
physics and chemistry. Where such a violation occurs, the structure ofthe higher 
level and/or lower level may be faulty. In the absence of this exception, higher and 
lower levels may be said to be related nonnally and as follows: (1) a lower level 
cannot contradict a higher level because the higher level is never specifiable in 
tenns of the lower level; and (2) a higher level cannot contradict a lower level be-
cause the higher level incorporates the lower level. 
It is in tenns of this nonnal relation of hierarchical orders that we understand 
Polanyi's belief that the Christian faith, concerned with "the supernatural aspect of 
anterior experience"(higher level) and scientific knowledge (lower level), "by-
pass each other." Similarly, Polanyi believes that miracles would no longer be 
miracles if they could be verified experimentally. He goes so far as to declare that 
"evidence that a fact has not occurred" (lower level) may leave its religious mean-
ing (higher level) intact. For example, the book of Genesis and the frescoes of 
Michelangelo represent the origin of the universe better than does an explanation 
of its origin in tenns of a random collection of atoms. 9 
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Polanyi must not be understood as implying, however, that religion lies outside 
the bounds of the knowledge continuum stretching from "factual experience" to 
"heuristic vision." The account in the book of Genesis and the frescoes of 
Michelangelo are metaphors and, as such, are akin to the matter that they em-
bodylO-i.e., the "nature and origin of the universe." Thus, although the facts they 
relate have not actually occurred, their kinship with their subject matter conveys 
certain truths which, as all truths, are part of the continuum. We understand him to 
mean that, because religion reflects the actual nature of epistemology-i.e., the 
grounding of all knowledge upon beliefs-and of the universe, it should not be re-
jected in toto even though claims of 'factual' knowledge regarding creation and 
claims of supernatural authority confirming traditional religious doctrines should 
be rejected. In other words, religion reflects accurately the universally valid ideals 
and ordering principles which Polanyi sees as relating the hierarchical orders. 
Therefore, he appears to hope for a renewal of religion as the means for recogniz-
ing and nurturing these ideals and principles. 11 
On occasion, Polanyi unwittingly compromises his position by drawing sharp 
distinctions between science and traditional religion on the basis of the natural ver-
sus the supernatural and the observational versus the mystical; his 1962 article, 
"Science and Faith," is one example. Here these sharp distinctions compromise 
the basic motif of the article, which is that religion is part of the continuum as de-
scribed above. 12 The validity of such sharp distinctions has been questioned by 
numerous authors including, as we have argued, Polanyi himself. 
II. Religious Knowing 
In Personal Knowledge, Polanyi notes that articulate frameworks, whether sci-
entific, artistic or religious, are used by the individual through the process of in-
dwelling. These articulate frameworks are grounded upon inarticulate frameworks 
which are also apprehended through indwelling. Both men and animals need the 
tension that derives from breaking out of one framework and entering into 
another-i.e., they crave "mental dissatisfaction." But men possess this need to a 
greater degree than animals. 13 
The indwelling which exhibits the most radical urge to break out manifests itself 
in ecstatic vision, an extreme form of religious mysticism. When functioning as 
observers and manipulators of experience, "we are guided by" and "pass through" 
experience without "experiencing it in itself." However, contemplation causes this 
"screen" between ourselves and experience to disappear and "pours us straight into 
experience; we cease to handle things and become immersed in them." The loss of 
self experienced during intense contemplation delives from the "complete partici-
pation of the individual in that which he contemplates." For these reasons, mysti-
cal vision, generally known as the via negativa, does not see things focally and 
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constitutes, in this respect, a "radical anti-intellectualism." Within this context, it 
is understandable why proximity to God cannot be observed. Mystical vision is 
closer to "sensual abandon" ("overwhelms and pervades") than to observation 
(sees things focally). 14 
The indwellings characteristic of Christianity are like other indwellings in that 
they are characterized by a built-in restlessness similar to the heuristic tension evi-
denced by a person's sense of his approach to the solution ofa problem. However, 
they are peculiar in their degree of intensity, in the degree of perfection sought and 
in their unresolvedness. 15 Consequently, the means employed by the Christian for 
attaining access to the presence of God, although similar to artistic creation and 
scientific discovery, is closer to the former in its considerable reliance upon pre-
conceptual-i.e., non-focal-4:apacities. Hence its kinship with the mystical via 
negativa. 
Polanyi's characterization of mysticism and Christianity largely in terms of the 
via negativa seems to rely upon the sharp distinction between science and tradi-
tional religion on the basis of the observational versus the mystical. He denies 
explicitly making such a sharp distinction: the difference between "verification" 
(proof by comparison with sensory experience) and "validation" (proof by rational 
argument) is one of degree, not of kind; both consist of some belief, though greater 
personal participation is involved in validation. 16 However, the tendency to 
characterize mysticism and Christianity as a via negativa has the practical effect of 
sharply distinguishing between the two and thus of denying the continuum consti-
tuted by all forms of human knowing. 
III. Myth 
Polanyi approaches the subject of myth through inquiry into the celebration of 
festivities and solemnities. He finds these to be metaphorical actions which lie at 
an intermediate position on the continuum between art and myth. A metaphor dif-
fers from other symbols in possessing a significance of its own which resembles 
the subject matter it embodies; it is like other symbols in that it stands for an in-
teresting object. 17 Symbolic standing for is structurally the opposite of designation 
or indication: "to designate the United States is to integrate a name to a country, 
while to symbolize the United States by a flag is to integrate a country to a flag."18 
What Polanyi appears to have in mind is something similar to Tillich's familiar 
contrast of the arbitrariness of designations (e.g., use ofa red lightto signify stop) 
to the organic relatedness of symbols (e. g., use of the American flag to symbolize 
the United States is an outgrowth of its history). Celebration of solemnities and 
festivities is symbolic in that actions without interest in themelves are performed 
for the sake of embodying (i.e., standing for) actions of essential importance to the 
life of the community. This performance is facilitated if there is a metaphorical re-
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semblance between the symbolic actions and the actions embodied in them. 
Festivities and works of art are similar in that the artificial circumstances of both 
isolate the imagination from ordinary everyday affairs and thus set it free. How-
ever, the break with ordinary circumstances is more direct in festivities than in art. 
Solemnities also both differ from and are similar to art. Solemnities are unorig-
inal, whereas art is original. A society uses solemnities to celebrate the abiding 
truth which resides in its communal existence. Tradition is the vehicle; it repre-
sents the enduring framework of a given society. Just as art consists of timeless 
moments, moments which are artificial in that they are withdrawn from ordinary 
everyday affairs, so also solemnities have a timeless quality. Modem dislike of all 
that is traditional breaks down this framework, tending to render our lives devoid 
of meaning. 
Metaphorical actions are even more prominent in archaic myths than in fes-
tivities and solemnities. These myths represent an expansion of the human mind 
allowing archaic man to view the world as a unified whole. Following the lead of 
Mircea Eliade, Polanyi accepts three fundamental theses concerning archaic 
myths. (1) A sharp distinction must be made between myth and other, everyday, 
functionings of the archaic mind. (2) The distinctive aspect of myth is that it pre-
sumes to be an account of creation. As such, mythical time differs from everyday 
time and is paradigmatic for all aspects of life. (3) Ritual is a reiteration, not a 
commemoration, of mythical time which permits persons participating in the ritual 
to become contemporary with creation. 19 
By its artificial circumstances, myth is detached from other, everyday function-
ings of the archaic mind in the same fashion as art is isolated from ordinary every-
day affairs. The artificial circumstances of myth consist in its concern for the 
whole world; daily affairs introduce us only to parts of the world. This inclusive-
ness of myth results from the integration of incompatibles and, as such, is possible 
only through an actofthe imagination. However, religious conceptions employing 
mythical wholeness must be labeled "mystical" as distinct other acts of the imagi-
nation because such conceptions originate in and refer to "boundless perspec-
tives." Here, as in the instances which we discussed previously, Polanyi speaks of 
mysticism as constituting a "radical antiintellectualism"and hence a "via 
negativa. " 
However, his characterization of myth is not entirely negative. For Polanyi, as 
for Eliade, myths are not irresponsibile creations of the human psyche; their funda-
mental thrust is that the world is full of meaning. In such a world, man does not feel 
confined to a solitary mode of existence unrelated to the larger whole. 20 Mythical 
and empirical thinking utilize the same integrative powers. Thus they do not differ 
in kind. Rather, the distinction is that archaic peoples regard few occurrences as 
accidental, whereas modem peoples, schooled in science, regard many occurr-
ences as accidental. This mythical view of the world is the result of the "pars pro 
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toto" doctrine (the part constitutes the whole); it attempts to inject mythical whole-
ness into daily life. The archaic mind exaggerates the relation of subsidiaries to 
their focus. Such exaggeration is most intense when the focal object is living, par-
ticularly a human being. Yet Polanyi believes that the archaic mind, more than the 
modem mind, recognizes correctly that subsidiaries are a part of their focus and 
thus that indwelling is a necessary part of the knowing process. What Polanyi has 
in mind is his familiar view that modem mechanistic interpretations of the universe 
and of the knowing process are aberrations. 
As in our discussion of Christianity and mysticism, we consider Polanyi's 
characterization of myth to be predominantly a via negativa. He does attribute a 
greater appreciation of the nature of the knowing process to the archaic mind than 
to the modem mind. However, this attribution does little to ameliorate his negative 
characterization of myth since in this instance greater epistemological insight does 
not impute substantive truth to mythical world views. Hence we are led again to 
conclude that Polanyi' s characterization of myth has the practical effect of denying 
the continuum constituted by all forms of human knowing and thus of compromis-
ing his basic view of religion. 
Having sketched Polanyi's view of religion, we shall investigate some addi-
tional problematic aspects. Polanyi believes that he has successfully delineated the 
cognitive content of a metaphor, whereas Max Black has not. 21 Polanyi sum-
marizes his position in the following diagrams and commentary: 
Since both the tenor and the vehicle in a metaphor have intrinsic in-
terest-both are significant ideas or expressions in themelves-we can 
diagram a metaphor thus: 
v 
+ii +ii 
S""'-'" F 
The tenor bears on the vehicle, but, as in the case of a symbol, the vehicle 
(the focal object) returns back to the tenor (the subsidiary element) and 
enhances its meaning, so that the tenor, in addition to bearing on, also be-
comes embodied in the vehicle. 
We can now schematize the way our rapture in a metaphor arises by ad-
ding a level involving ourselves, thus: 
Ourselves (t~v), 
+ti +ti +ti 
S ~----:O---... =+-. F 
As in the symbol, so in the metaphor: the subsidiary clues-consisting of 
all those inchoate experiences in our own lives that are related to the two 
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parts of a metaphor-are integrated into the meaning of a tenor and a veh-
icle as they are related to each other in a focal object (a metaphor). The re-
sult is that a metaphor, like a symbol, carries us away, embodies us in it-
self, and moves us deeply as we surrender ourselves to ie2 
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These diagrammatic representations, as well as others for denotation and symboli-
zation, summarize what Polanyi regards as the superiority of his characterization 
of metaphor over that of Black. 
The diagrams constitute a valuable contribution toward the understanding of 
metaphor; however, it is difficult to discern where Polanyi surpasses Black in de-
tailing the cogniti ve content of metaphor. Black follows I. A. Richards in account-
ing for the functioning of metaphor by the likeness and unlikeness of its two parts, 
the tenor and the vehicle. The cognitive content of a metaphor resides in the con-
nection which the reader makes between the two. Black does not generalize further 
because he regards this cognitive content as dependent upon the particular reader 
and context. Although Polanyi enhances the discussion by introducing additional 
technical terms, such as his familiar distinction between subsidiary elements and 
focal object, his basic characterization of metaphor is similar to that of Black and 
Richards. Nor is his delineation of the cognitive content of metaphor dissimilar to 
that of Black, since for Polanyi the relation of subsidiary elements to focal content 
is dependent ultimately upon the particular reader and context and, therefore, can 
never be made fully explicit. Polanyi could have surpassed Black in detailing the 
cognitive content of metaphor only by abandoning his epistemology. 
The preceding discussion requires qualification. We have been dealing with 
Polanyi's treatment of metaphor as if it were part of a complete system. However, 
during certain of the lectures later incorported into Meaning, Polanyi was quick to 
admit that his views on metaphor were offered without the benefit of a fully de-
veloped aesthetic. In this light, our critique might be regarded as simply stating the 
obvious. Nevertheless, it does call attention to a less than comprehensive treat-
ment of metaphor. 
To illustrate our point further, consider three characteristics of metaphor which 
are neglected by Polanyi. Although metaphor is discussed in a chapter of Meaning 
entitled, "From Perception to Metaphor," Polanyi never considers it explicitly in 
terms of real or imaginary sense images as does Bernard Lonergan. 23 Nor does he 
consider explicitly the manner in which metaphors mediate between sense images 
and higher-level abstractions as does Ian Barbour in his discussion of the function 
of models. Both Polanyi and Barbour rely upon a theory-observation continuum 
and utilize Richards' and Black's views of metaphor as a point of departure. How-
ever, Barbour considers metaphor explicitly within the larger context of the role of 
models; model and metaphor function similarly. The heuristic or cognitive func-
tion resides in the connection between either and that upon which it bears (in 
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Polanyi's terminology, tenor and vehicle). Barbour concludes that models, like 
metaphors, should be taken seriously but not literally because the connection in-
volves both likeness and unlikeness. 24 Since models may be used as mediators at 
any level of the theory-observation continuum, we may regard them as illustrative 
of the mediation of metaphors between sense images and higher-level abstrac-
tions. 
Paul Ricoeur's comparison of poetry and prose provides an example of the third 
characteristic of metaphor which Polanyi neglects. The multivalent, and therefore 
richly ambiguous, character of poetic metaphor has long been appreciated, accord-
ing to Ricoeur, but recognition of the equal multivalence of prose sentences and, 
therefore, of the similarity of prose to poetry is a more recent attainment. 25 Polanyi 
is aware of this multivalence and speaks about "man's well-nigh unlimited capac-
ity to interpret grammatically formed sentences. "26 However, his definitions of in-
dication (e.g., "to integrate a name to a country") and symbolism (e.g., "to integ-
rate a country to a flag") seem intent upon distinguishing poetry from prose rather 
than upon pointing to their similarities. Yet the two men cannot disagree ulti-
mately; indication and symbolism must be essentially similar if Polanyi's theory-
observation continuum is to hold. 
Polanyi's unsystematic treatment of metaphor may elucidate certain aspects of 
his view of religion. He compromises his basic position-that religion is a part of 
the continuum constituted by all forms of human knowing-by utilizing at times a 
natural versus supernatural dichotomy to distinguish science from religion, and by 
characterizing mysticism, Christianity and myths largely in terms of a via 
negativa. It is these compromises which may be illuminated by relating them to his 
unsystematic treatment of metaphor. 
While acknowledging religion to be part of the continuum constituted by all 
fonus of human knowing, Polanyi qualified this position during a seminar as fol-
lows. Both science and religion produce mysteries. The mysteries on the scientific 
end of the continuum carry one's imagination in distinct directions, whereas those 
on the religious end do not. Polanyi confessed that he did not stress the existence of 
such a continuum because of the danger that this difference between religion and 
other fonus of knowing would be obscured. Thus, although he did not distinguish 
sharply between science and religion, he was unable to discern a principle of con-
tinuity between the two. The most that he was willing to affirm was the presence of 
a tacit dimension throughout the continuum. 27 
Had he sought complete systematization, Polanyi would have been better ad-
vised to distinguish between religion and other disciplines solely on the basis of the 
continuum constituted by all fonus of human knowing-i.e., on the basis of more 
comprehensive personal participation. Adopting such a position, Ian Barbour ar-
gues that religion, like science, must justify its claims ultimately by appeal to 
human experience-i. e. , it must be empirical in some extended sense of the term. 28 
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To argue as Polanyi did in the seminar that religion does not carry one's imagina-
tion in any distinct direction is equivalent to saying that the religious imagination 
does not yield knowledge, or at least none that is distinctly religious. Obviously, 
such a position, if taken literally, would contradict the knowing continuum so cen-
tral to his epistemology and must be regarded as indicative of an unsystematic 
treatment. 
This lack of systematization is not readily apparent because in Polanyi' s thought 
the "free society" appropriates many functions associated with traditional reli-
gion-most notably, guarantor of the viability of a tolerant, open society commit-
ted to the fostering of truth. In other words, the free society is fully capable of sus-
taining the sort of culture deemed most beneficial without the aid of religion. The 
individual depends upon his community for nurture and inspiration in his search 
for truth; for Polanyi, the scientific community is paradigmatic. Because he finds 
truth and morality to be essentially similar (they exist on a continuum), he also 
considers the scientific community to be paradigmatic for the nurture of morality. 29 
In Meaning, Polanyi refines his view of the free society and departs from his ear-
lier position, sketched above, by distinguishing between truth and morality. Truth 
constitutes the "greatest standard motivation" in science and must be distinguished 
from "what is right or fair or just in a distributive sense" (i.e., morality) which con-
stitutes the "highest standard of motivation" of political persuasion. Another re-
finement is his admission of the Kantian nature of his position: once grasped, some 
ideal ends-such as truth, justice and beauty--demand our adherence. Thus we re-
gard them as possessing "inherent worth" and functioning in a manner similar to 
Kant's categorical imperative. 3D Both in Meaning and in Personal Knowledge, 
Polanyi's conception of hierarchical levels allows him to grant the validity of real-
politik on one level while denying it on a higher level (by definition, a higher level 
is not specifiable in terms of a lower level). He concludes that the moral (higher) 
level is grounded upon an essentially nonmoral (lower) level which places limita-
tions on the higher level. 
Polanyi's view of the free society, while appealing, is not without its difficul-
ties. The discussion in Personal Knowledge of the moral-intellectual continuum 
defines "moral judgments"as choices requiring total self-involvement and "intel-
lectual valuations" as choices requiring use of only part of one's faculties. Accord-
ing to this definition of moral judgments, men are moral to the extent that they 
make choices utilizing all of their faculties, thereby controlling their "whole 
selves" rather than just exercising some of their "faculties. "31 Such control makes 
possible the rise of what Polanyi calls free societies, for which the scientific com-
munity is paradigmatic. An existing and enlightened free society establishes "al-
most automatically," by means of the checks and balances among its members, the 
most universally valid standards known to it. 
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This definition of morality is rather straightforward. But Polanyi' s discussion of 
the moral-intellectual continuum as it affects the individual and his relation to so-
ciety suggests the following question whose answer could result in qualification of 
the moral-intellectual continuum. Why should not a man strive to pattern his life 
after truths which are in conflict with what Polanyi regards as universally valid 
moral-intellectual standards? For example, in spite of total self-involvement, is it 
not possible that the individual might choose relatively selfish interests for the sake 
of greater wealth when choice of less egocentric moral standards would result in 
less wealth- assuming that the particular society in which the choice is made 
would not effectively hinder the exercise of such choice? 
It could be argued, in answer to the preceeding question, that Polanyi' s view of 
morality allows some to choose relatively selfish standards because they are lack-
ing in commitment to universal moral standards. The assumption here is that the 
commitment required by total self-involvement includes acceptance of what 
Polanyi regards as universally valid moral standards. Acceptance of this assump-
tion would mean that our question has no real bearing upon Polanyi's conception 
of morality. 
Our reply is that such an assumption is questionable. It requires that total self-in-
volvement tend toward only one general set of universal moral standards, 
Polanyi's set. We consider this assumption to be unwarranted, because some men 
have lived and continue to live by other general sets of universal moral standards. 
For example, the man who, given a choice, chooses selfish interests, is in effect 
subscribing to the following moral standard which he regards as universally valid: 
the indulgence of selfish interests is to be desired provided that any gains not be 
offset by unwanted consequences. 
It is not evident to us upon what grounds Polanyi is able to judge that total self-
involvement tends toward only one set of universal moral standards and thus that 
other universal moral standards are mistaken, except by appealing to the nature of 
truth-i.e., of universally valid standards. However, is not such an appeal mis-
leading in that it seeks to settle a question regarding actual knowledge-i.e., the 
nature of morality-by appealing to epistemology-i.e., the nature of the know-
. ing process? Indeed, is this not the crucial weakness of Polanyi' s view of morality, 
an unwarranted and unexplained conflation of questions regarding actual knowl-
edge with purely epistemological questions? An egocentric individual such as the 
one described above could conceivably accept Polanyi's conception of truth while 
rejecting his conception of morality. Hence for this individual the moral-intellec-
tual continuum upon which Polanyi's view of morality depends would be shat-
tered. 
Similar questions can be raised with respect to his discussion of the free society 
in Meaning. Polanyi's comparison of ideal ends to Kant's categorical imperative 
implies that any alternatives to these ends are lacking in rationality, just as Kant 
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claims that his categorical imperative is the only rational basis for ethics. This is 
tantamount to claiming sole legitimacy for the set of values based upon the ideal 
ends. Within the context of Polanyi's epistemology, which unlike that of Kant 
stresses the contextual, historical nature of knowledge, such claims must be re-
garded as mere assertion unless supported by substantive arguments. Since the dis-
cussion in Meaning does not so much seek to justify as to explicate the nature of the 
free society, the difficulties noted in regard to the discussion in Personal Knowl-
edge have not been resolved. 
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